Abstract. We study divisor class halving for hyperelliptic curves of genus 2 over binary fields. We present explicit halving formulas for the most interesting curves (from a cryptographic perspective), as well as all other curves whose group order is not divisible by 4. Each type of curve is characterized by the degree and factorization form of the polynomial h(x) in the curve equation. For each of these curves, we provide explicit halving formulae for all possible divisor classes, and not only the most frequent case where the degree of the first polynomial in the Mumford representation is 2. In the optimal performance case, where h(x) = x, we also improve on the state-of-the-art and when h(x) is irreducible of degree 2, we achieve significant savings over both the doubling as well as the previously fastest halving formulas.
Introduction
The double-and-add algorithm is essential to the efficiency of cryptosystems based on hyperelliptic curves. This algorithm (and many of its variations) is based on two basic group operations: the addition of two distinct group elements and the computation of the double of an element. An alternative that proved very successful in elliptic curves over binary fields is the halve-and-add algorithm, which relies on the computation of the "half" of a group element (of odd order), i.e. the computation of a pre-image of the doubling operation [9, 14] . Given the important savings produced by this approach for elliptic curves, it is natural to ask if similar results can be obtained for hyperelliptic curves over binary fields.
In a double-and-add algorithm, we can use explicit formulae for the most common cases of the doubling and the addition, going back to Cantor's polynomialbased algorithm if any special cases are encountered. In practice, using explicit formulae for the special cases has no measurable impact on the average performance of a scalar multiplication, so it is not essential to develop them. The same is not true for the halve-and-add algorithm however, since we cannot easily describe the halving operation in terms of polynomial arithmetic. A halve-and-add algorithm should therefore contain explicit formulae for all possible cases of the halving operation.
In this paper we investigate halving of divisor classes of hyperelliptic curves of genus 2 over finite fields of characteristic 2. Doubling formulae for the different types of curves can be found in [10, 11, 1] and halving for some types of curves and/or cases have also been investigated in [7, 8, 3] . We present halving formulae for all cases (most frequent and special cases) for all curves having at most one divisor of order 2 and no divisor of order 4 (see the second half of Section 2.2 for the reasons behind this condition). Rather than inverting the best doubling formulae, we invert Cantor's algorithm, using the divisibility condition on semireduced divisors to lower the cost. In the optimal performance case, where h(x) = x, we also improve on the state-of-the-art [3] and when h(x) is irreducible of degree 2, we achieve significant savings over both the doubling [1] as well as the currently fastest halving formulas [7] .
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows: Section 2 contains some important terminology and background. In Section 3, we develop a complete case study of the halving formulae in the most efficient curves for cryptographic application, and in Section 4 we do the same for the most general type of curves where halving is of interest. For completeness, full sets of formulae for the remaining types of curves where halving can be efficient are presented in the appendix, as well as the addition formula for the form of curve equation used in Section 4.
Basic Notations and Preliminaries
In this section we briefly recall the definitions of hyperelliptic curves, divisor class groups and the Mumford representation since we will use these notions throughout the whole paper.
A comprehensive resource for the mathematics of finite fields is [12] . For background on hyperelliptic curves we refer the interested reader to [1] , from which the following definitions and notations are taken.
Definition 1 (Hyperelliptic curve of genus 2 in characteristic 2). Let F q be a field of characteristic 2 and F q its algebraic closure. A curve C, given by an equation of the form
where f ∈ F q [x] is a polynomial of degree 5 and h ∈ F q [x] is a non-zero polynomial of degree at most 2, is called an imaginary hyperelliptic curve of genus 2 over F q if there is no point (x, y) on the curve over F q for which both partial derivatives are 0, i.e. such that h(x) = 0 and f ′ (x) − h ′ (x)y = 0 (This last condition ensures that the affine curve is non-singular).
Definition 2 (Divisor class group). Given a hyperelliptic curve C of genus 2 over a binary field F q , the group of degree 0 divisors of C is denoted by Div Theorem 1 (Mumford). Let C be a hyperelliptic curve of genus 2 over a binary field F q . Each nontrivial divisor class of C over F q can be represented by a unique pair of polynomials u, v ∈ F q [x], where
A divisor satisfying Theorem 1 is called reduced (i.e. it is the shortest representative of its class), and if the condition deg(u) ≤ 2 is removed, the divisor is called semi-reduced. The divisibility condition will be essential in establishing some of the halving formulae. Our halving formulae expect the input divisor class to be in Mumford representation, work directly on the coefficients of the polynomials u and v and return an output in Mumford form. Since our goal is to compute pre-images of the group doubling, we refer to Algorithm 1 for a description of how this operation is performed using Cantor's algorithm.
Algorithm 1 Cantor's/Koblitz's doubling algorithm for genus 2 HEC in characteristic 2
Input:
Reduced
We observe that all the pairs of polynomials computed in Algorithm 1 satisfy the divisibility condition of Theorem 1, i.e. u 0 |v c + v c h + f . To obtain our halving formulae, we sometime use the identities coming from these divisibility conditions rather than those which are more obvious in the polynomial equalities of Algorithm 1. In exchange, any identity which is not used to perform the halving becomes a divisibility condition that must be satisfied for [u i (x), v i (x)] to be a semi-reduced divisor.
Field Arithmetic and Divisor Halving
Throughout this paper, we will assume that the field F q has order 2 n where n is not divisible by 2 or 3. This is mainly due to security concerns, since various versions of the Weil descent attack could be applied when n admits a factor of 2 or 3 (for example, see [6, 15, 5] ). In fact, for cryptographic applications it is often assumed that n is a prime. As an added bonus, having n coprime to 2 means that we can take cube and 5-th roots in the field (since α 3 and α
5
are both isomorphism as 3 and 5 are coprime to 2 n − 1), which allows us to simplify the curve equations a little more. Furthermore, since n will be odd we will have Tr(1) = 1. In various places, we implicitly take advantage of the identity Tr(α) = Tr(α 2 ) to simplify some trace computations. In finite fields of characteristic 2, some operations which are very expensive in fields of odd characteristic become very efficient, in particular computing the roots of a quadratic equation (when they are available in the field of definition). This observation led to the development of halve-and-add algorithms, a variation of the double-and-add scalar multiplication where the doubling operation is replaced with a halving (the representation of the scalar is adjusted accordingly). Such an approach was first used for elliptic curves [9, 14] , and was recently extended to hyperelliptic curves of genus 2 [7, 8, 3] . In some fields, computing of square roots can be faster than the computation of squares [4, 2] . Two other operations, the trace (from F 2 n to F 2 ) and the half-trace (HT, to solve quadratic equations, see [4, 2] ), can also be implemented to have similar costs to the squaring operation. For curves over those fields, it can be a good strategy to "replace" squares with square roots in the group arithmetic, which is often what halving does.
To count the number of operations, we denote inverses by I, multiplications by M, squares by S, square roots by SR, traces by TR, and half-traces by HT.
Choices of curves
An imaginary hyperelliptic curve of genus 2 over F 2 d is of the form
where
It is also customary to use isomorphisms to impose that f (x) is monic, i.e. that f 5 = 1, but we will relax this condition for some curves as the halving formulae are more efficient if we use the isomorphisms to force h 1 = 1. We also note that when h(x) is constant (i.e. h 2 = h 1 = 0), the curve is known to be supersingular, and therefore of limited interest for cryptography, but we will still cover these curves for completeness.
For the curve (2), the possible isomorphisms are given by x = αx + β and y = γỹ + δx 2 + ǫx + ζ, where both α and γ are nonzero, after which the equation is divided by γ 2 to get the coefficient of y 2 back to 1. We distinguish five types of curves depending on the degree and factorization type of h(x):
Ia h 2 = 0 and h(x) irreducible: Using α and γ we can force h 2 = h 1 = 1. We can then use β to restrict h(x) to x 2 + x + 1. The remaining freedom on β allows us to impose Tr(f 5 ) · Tr(f 4 ) = 0. Taking advantage of δ, we can restrict f 4 to {0, 1} and then ǫ and ζ allow us to remove f 3 and f 2 . We are left with f (x) = f 5 x 5 + f 4 x 4 + f 1 x + f 0 where f 4 ∈ F 2 and f 4 · Tr(f 5 ) = 0. Ib h 2 = 0 and h(x) is the product of two distinct linear factors: Using β and one of the roots of h(x), we can force h 0 = 0. We can then use α and γ to restrict h(x) to x 2 + x. The remaining freedom on β allows us to impose Tr(f 5 ) · Tr(f 4 ) = 0. Taking advantage of δ, we can restrict f 4 to {0, 1} and then ǫ and ζ allow us to remove f 3 and f 2 . We are left with f (x) = f 5 x 5 + f 4 x 4 + f 1 x + f 0 where f 4 ∈ F 2 and f 4 · Tr(f 5 ) = 0. Ic h 2 = 0 and h(x) a square: Using α and β and γ, we can force h(x) = x 2 and make f (x) monic. ǫ and ζ allow us to remove f 3 and f 2 . Finally, δ can be used to limit f 4 to {0, 1}, leaving us with
II h 2 = 0, h 1 = 0: Using α and β and γ, we can force h(x) = x and make f (x) monic. δ and ζ allow us to remove f 4 and f 1 . Finally, we restrict f 2 using ǫ,
Using α and γ, we can force h(x) = 1 and make f (x) monic. By selecting δ, ǫ and β wisely, we can remove f 4 and f 2 and reduce the number of possible values of f 1 (in general to a set of at most 16 values). Finally, ζ can be used to limit f 0 to {0, 1}, leaving us with
Note that we did not include the non-singularity condition, nor conditions on the group order in the descriptions of the different types. In terms of isomorphism classes, types Ia and Ib are the most common (each with 3 2 q 3 + O(q 2 ) classes), followed by types II and Ic (each with 2q 2 + O(q) classes) and with type III (supersingular) the less common (O(q) classes). From the point of view of the 2-torsion group, type Ic is closer to type II than type Ia and Ib.
We limit ourselves to curves for which the order of the Jacobian is either odd (h(x) constant) or 2 times an odd number (which eliminates all type Ib curves). This restriction is needed to get a better performance out of the halving. Given any hyperelliptic curve, the halve-and-add algorithm allows us to compute the scalar multiple of a divisor class, given that it is in a (sub)group of odd order. In this way, the pre-image of the doubling can always be computed and "becomes" unique (all other pre-images of the doubling have even order). The group order conditions are due to the following reasons:
1. To verify that the pre-image is in the subgroup of odd order, we make sure that it can be halved again as many times as we want. If the group contains divisors of order 2 r , we must make sure that we can halve the pre-image (at least) r times, which obviously affects the cost of our halving formulae. When r ≥ 2 (i.e. when there are divisors of order 4), the increased work required for this check becomes too expensive for the halving to be interesting. 2. If C is of type Ib, there are four possible pre-images of the doubling. The halving formula must then distinguish which of the four is in the subgroup of odd order, which significantly increases the cost of the halving. We also computed formulae in this case, and the halving does indeed become much more expensive than the doubling.
When we consider all the isomorphisms classes for a given type of curves (other than type III), between a half and two thirds of them have divisors of order 4, so rejecting these curves has an acceptably small impact on the number of possible curves. Furthermore, because of the attack of Pohlig and Hellman [13] , curves with divisors of order 4 are in general (slightly) weaker than those without, so the restriction can be seen as advantageous for the security of the curves. From a cryptographic perspective, the two most interesting types of curves for halving formulae are type II (most efficient halving) and type Ia (largest number of isomorphism classes). In terms of the benefits of halving over doubling, type Ia gives the best savings.
Type II: h(x) = x
In this section, the curve C is of the form 
. From this observation, we get the following corollary which allow us to distinguish the different special cases. Finally, to verify that we are computing the pre-image of odd order, we use the conditions of Theorem 2 on u c (x) to ensure that it could be halved again (i.e. that it has odd order), and we correct the computations if necessary. We obtain the following formulae:
⊲ Average: 1I+7.5M+2S+4SR+1HT+1TR
⊲ Average: 6M+3.5SR+1TR+1HT
3:
4: else 5:
⊲ Average: 0.5I+3M+1SR+1TR
In this section, the curve C is of the form y 2 +(x 2 +x+1)y = f 5 x 5 +f 4 x 4 +f 1 x+f 0 with f 4 ∈ F 2 and f 4 · Tr(f 5 ) = 0. To improve the efficiency of the formulae, we will assume that f are precomputed (only once per curve). Proof. To prove this, we can follow the same ideas as in Theorem 2, with one difference: some of the halving formulae require to solve two quadratic (nonsquare) equations rather than one. In those formulae, it is easy to verify that switching between the roots of the first quadratic equation (adding one to the half-trace) changes the trace of the constant term of the second quadratic equation by 1. The choice of root for the first equation (when roots exist in F q ) and the trace condition from the second equation are then purely internal to the halving formula.
From this theorem, we obtain a simple condition for the group order: Finally, to verify that we are computing the pre-image of odd order, we use the conditions of Theorem 3 on u c (x) to ensure it could be halved again (i.e. that it has odd order), and we correct the computations if necessary. We obtain the following formulae:
6: 
⊲ Average: 1I+15.5M+2SR+2TR+2HT
Note that for curves with f 5 = 1, the worst-case complexity decreases to 1I+13M+2SR+2HT+2TR. If we move the computation of s 11 and s 12 before the second trace computation (which becomes Tr(s 12 )), then the average complexity drops to 1I+12M+2SR+2HT+2TR (with that approach, a multiplication is required to correct s 12 ). ⊲ Average: 5M+2SR+1S+1TR
Conclusion
We investigated the halving of divisor classes of hyperelliptic curves of genus 2 over binary fields. We provided new and improved formulae for all cases of the halving for all types of curves whose divisor class group has at most one divisor of order 2 and does not contain any divisor of order 4. We summarize our results for the most common cases in the table below, where we also compare with doubling formulae [10, 11, 1] and with the fast halving formulae available in previous papers [7, 8, 3] . Note that Kitamura, Katagi and Takagi [7, 8] also provide a brief description of halving for type Ic curves, but the best approximation for the cost would be from their formulae for type Ia curves with h 1 = f 5 = 1.
For curves of type Ic and III, our halving formulae are as efficient as the doubling. For type II curves, our halving formulae improve on the state-of-theart, although not sufficiently to match the efficiency of the doubling. Our most important gain comes from type Ia curves, where our halving cost is significantly lower than both the doubling and the previous best halving formulae.
